Dispatch from Guangzhou: Stabilizing US-China Relations in the Arctic

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The Xue Long 2 Chinese research vessel, surveilled by the U.S. Coast Guard, approximately 290 nautical miles north of Utqiagvik, Alaska, July 2025. Photo: U.S. Coast Guard

The Arctic Institute China Series 2025

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Recent conversations with Chinese experts at an academic conference in Guangzhou tell me that China views President Donald Trump’s Arctic policy as a volatile mix of transactions and militarization.

In December 2025, I flew to the bustling southern metropolis of Guangzhou to speak at a conference about the future of US-China cooperation in the Arctic. Guangzhou sits deep in the subtropics, worlds away from the icy north, but the region is increasingly important in China’s strategic plans.

Between dodging electric scooters and devouring the world’s best dim sum, we discussed Arctic shipping, Alaska-China trade, maritime safety, and joint climate research. The conference brought together American and Chinese policy experts, polar scientists, lawyers, and shipping executives. If you only listened to the drumbeat of “great power competition,” you’d expect headstrong confrontation. Instead, what I heard was something more complicated and hopeful.

Chinese experts are wary of a US Arctic policy that downplays climate science and threatens to annex Greenland, but they still argue for risk reduction, crisis management, and joint scientific research. The Arctic should be seen as a region for stabilizing US-China relations.

China’s Arctic role

In Beijing’s 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper, China defines itself as a “near Arctic state” committed to “understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic.” China’s engagement in the Arctic is growing because climate change in the Far North reverberates around the world, impacting Chinese agriculture, weather, and infrastructure. Moreover, the potential opening of shipping routes and access to natural resources carry global significance.

By positioning itself as an Arctic stakeholder, China seeks to ensure it has a voice in shaping the region’s future. As a country outside the region, China’s Arctic aims are only achievable through partnership.

China has been an observer state at the Arctic Council since 2013, giving Beijing a seat at the table to build relations with Arctic states and monitor discussions on regional issues. China participates across the UN system, from the Paris Agreement to the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and in scientific bodies like the International Arctic Science Committee.

On paper, China is more embedded in parts of Arctic governance than the US, which has still not ratified UNCLOS. Chinese experts point to this web of institutions as proof that China doesn’t just have an interest but also the right to help govern the Arctic.

How China sees Trump

At the conference, one Chinese Arctic scholar put it bluntly: “Trump 2.0’s Arctic policy will have a profoundly negative impact on Arctic governance.” To Chinese experts, President Biden saw great power competition as a clash of ideologies but at least maintained a commitment to climate science and multilateralism. In contrast, Trump’s approach looks like pure deal-making and rivalry.

They view the current US approach as having abandoned the strategies of predecessors like Presidents Obama and Biden, which, despite tensions, emphasized climate science and multilateralism (therefore opening the door to cooperation with China).

Now, they see Trump ramping up military posturing in the Arctic and treating the region as a national security flashpoint. They’re watching as the US builds up bases, sends F-35s to Alaska and B-1B Lancer bombers to Norway, and rushes to acquire more icebreakers. From Beijing’s point of view, this looks less like stewardship and more like militarization.

Chinese experts said that challenges to Arctic governance include Trump’s proposals to annex Greenland, which they saw as a colonial throwback, and the possibility of a US-Russian “partition” of the Arctic into spheres of influence.

During the Q&A, Chinese experts asked American colleagues: Do Americans support taking Greenland? What mechanisms exist for Americans to stop Trump from seizing Greenland?

During coffee breaks, talk turned to Trump’s newly released National Security Strategy. Some welcomed the shift away from Biden’s “democracy versus autocracy” mantra and the focus on the Western Hemisphere, hoping the US might ease up on military moves in the South China Sea or stop trying to engineer political change inside China. However, they also see the new strategy doubling down on deterrence around Taiwan, the First Island Chain, and key maritime chokepoints—including those that touch the Arctic.

Climate justice on thin ice

Chinese experts emphasized international climate justice. For them, the core conflict is between developed and developing countries’ “rights and obligations.” They argued that countries like China have the right to develop, while wealthier nations like the US, which have produced most of the world’s emissions, are obligated to lead the way on cutting emissions.

They cited the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” Chinese scholars argued that the erosion of this norm has diminished trust globally and in the Arctic.

Speakers highlighted the human dimensions of Arctic change. There was a focus on how experts see China’s role in supporting Indigenous communities and addressing community‑level impacts of climate change.

Experts pointed to China’s own history with traditional knowledge (such as traditional Chinese medicine) as proof that the country respects alternative epistemologies and ways of understanding the world. It was a somewhat idealized analogy, but the message was clear: Beijing wants to frame itself as sympathetic to Indigenous knowledge systems to support its image as a responsible Arctic stakeholder.

The Alaska standoff

The most animated discussions focused on a July 2025 incident, when a Chinese icebreaker entered the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near Alaska to conduct research, prompting a US Coast Guard response. China sent four more icebreakers to the region in the following weeks.

In Washington, this was portrayed as a Chinese provocation. For China, it was seen as a lawful exercise of maritime rights. Chinese experts insisted the US had no grounds to object; under UNCLOS, China didn’t need permission to do research in that area.

Some argued that if the US wants to have any real authority when it comes to China’s actions near Alaska, or anywhere else in the Arctic, it needs to finally join UNCLOS. Until then, they said, American protests sound empty.

It’s a familiar line for folks in the US who want to ratify UNCLOS: the best way to defend American interests in the Arctic is not unilateral action, but rather to bind everyone, including the US and China, to the same set of rules.

The Department of Homeland Security has been speeding up its acquisition of a new icebreaker fleet due to the “unprecedented number of Chinese military and research vessels operating in or near U.S. Arctic waters.”

Hope for cooperation

Despite the tensions, pragmatism permeated our discussions. In the Arctic, the U.S. and China can cooperate in Arctic maritime safety, scientific research, and economic relations.

China is Alaska’s largest trade partner. With Arctic maritime traffic expected to increase in the coming decades, it’s just common sense to work together on maritime safety. As the ice melts, the risks multiply. No one wins if there’s an accident or environmental disaster in the Bering Strait. Maritime safety cooperation may include information sharing, joint exercises, and mutual support during emergencies.

One Chinese executive offered a creative idea: why not rename the Northeast Passage the “Alaska Passage”? The logic was to remove the Eurocentrism of the label, as the waterway is only “northeast” if you’re sitting in Europe. While the expert acknowledged that the main shipping route is still between China and Europe, the linguistic shift hints at centering the Pacific relationship.

The Chinese experts I met aren’t naïve about what the US wants, and they don’t expect Americans to be naïve about China either. They see cooperation with rivals as the only way to manage risks, prevent miscalculation, and keep the Arctic’s fragile ecosystem from falling apart.

The view from China is that they are in the Arctic to stay. A foreign policy of competitive coexistence would acknowledge this reality, engaging Beijing where interests align (such as on maritime safety and trade) while managing differences through diplomacy rather than military posturing.

Conclusion

This commentary concludes The Arctic Institute’s 2025 Series on China in the Arctic. This series reveals that understanding China’s Arctic role requires examining Beijing’s activities across multiple dimensions: geopolitical competition, regional cooperation, digital infrastructure, critical minerals, and evolving governance frameworks.

A central debate emerges throughout: whether Western alarm over China’s Arctic presence reflects strategic reality or ideological bias, with several analyses suggesting that selective cooperation between China and Arctic states may serve as a stabilizing force in great power relations. The Sino-Russian partnership, while significant, proves more complex than often portrayed, marked by fundamental divergences and limited situational cooperation rather than unified strategic alignment. These multifaceted analyses underscore why China warrants continued scholarly attention in the Arctic. China is a pivotal actor whose intentions and impacts require rigorous and balanced examination from diverse analytical perspectives.

Pavel Devyatkin is a Senior Associate at The Arctic Institute.